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Comments
Reconsideration of Scope of Review for Habeas
Corpus from Military Courts
INTRODUCTION
Until several years ago, most people, lawyers and laymen alike, had
little concern for the nature of the military justice system and its
relation to the state and federal systems of justice. Unless one were a
career soldier, had served in the armed services, or lived near a military
base, military law never captured his attention or touched his personal
life. However, with the United States' increased involvement in the
Vietnam conflict and resulting governmental prosecutions of individ-
uals for the commission of "battle-related crimes," the military justice
system has increasingly come to the attention of the American public.
The widespread, intense, and pervasive coverage by the news media of
the trial of Lieutenant William L. Calley caused his trial to become
a frequent subject of conversation.'
This article deals mainly with the relationship between the military
justice system and the habeas corpus power of the federal district courts.
Habeas corpus affords collateral, as opposed to direct relief; therefore,
only those aspects of the military justice system are discussed which
are relevant to this collateral remedy. A brief historical overview of
habeas review of military decisions is given, culminating in a discussion
and proposed interpretation of the decision rendered by the United
States Supreme Court in Burns v. Wilson,2 which remains the control-
ling judicial authority in this area. Lastly, the article criticizes those
federal circuits which have narrowly interpreted the Burns decision
when confronted with an argument based upon the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The habeas corpus power of the federal judiciary is not a creature
of congressional largesse. As the United States Supreme Court noted
1. United States v. Calley, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 96, C.M.R. 96 (1969).
2. 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
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in Fay v. Noia,8 the power to inquire into the legality of a petitioner's
confinement is an inherent faculty of a court in Anglo-American law.
Anglo-American courts have employed this extraordinary writ to
guarantee that no person shall be confined unless such confinement is
consistent with fundamental fairness.4 For its noble connection with
human liberty, it has been appropriately called the "Great Writ." The
Framers of the United States Constitution expressly incorporated and
guaranteed the preservation of the habeas corpus power.5 Congress has
historically recognized and implemented the Framers' mandate.6 The
present federal habeas corpus statute draws no distinction between
persons confined pursuant to the decree of a civilian court, state or
federal, and those confined under the order of a military court-martial.7
Nor is there any language in either the Constitution, or any statute,
specifically limiting collateral, civilian court review of a court-martial
conviction.8 Although the "finality clause" of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ) 9 purports to bar any civilian review of military
decisions, both the legislative history of the UCMJ and judicial inter-
pretation maintain the propriety of civilian collateral review.10 Al-
3. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
4. One of the earliest reported cases in which the writ of habeas corpus was employed
was Bushel's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (1670).
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 provides: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of Rebellion or Invasion the Public Safety
may require it."
6. The first habeas corpus statute was part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14,
1 Stat. 81.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(l)-(2) (1970) grants to federal civil courts power to entertain
the writ in cases where a prisoner is in custody of a state court or in custody "under or
by color of the authority of the United States" or under "an order . . . [or] judgment . . .
of a court or judge of the United States."
8. Lacking the power of direct appellate review over the determinations of military
tribunals, the civilian courts are limited to relief of a collateral nature. Direct appellate
review procedures for the military are provided for in the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1970) [hereinafter cited as UCMJ]. The decisions of general
courts-martial are given three direct reviews by military appellate bodies. Review is given
by the convening authority, pursuant to UCMJ art. 64, 10 U.S.C. § 864 (1970); the United
States Army Court of Military Review, pursuant to UCMJ art. 66, 10 U.S.C. § 866 (1970);
and the United States Court of Military Appeals, pursuant to UCMJ art. 76, 10 U.S.C.
§ 867 (1970).
9. UCMJ art. 76, 10 U.S.C. § 876 (1970) provides: "The appellate review of records
of trial provided by this chapter, the proceedings, findings and sentences of courts-martial
as approved, reviewed, or affirmed, as required by this chapter, and all dismissals and
discharges carried into execution under sentences by courts-martial following approval,
review or affirmation as required by this chapter, are final and conclusive. (emphasis
added).
10. Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U.S. 128 (1950). The reasoning of the Supreme Court was
that the finality clause, in this case of the Articles of War, should not be read as a suspen-
sion of the writ. That clause was meant only to describe the terminal point in the military
justice system. Congress never intended to deprive the civil courts of the power of col-
lateral review, which existed long before the Artides of War.
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though the propriety of habeas review of military decisions seems be-
yond dispute, the scope of that review has been a subject of controversy.
In Ex parte Reed," the Supreme Court first considered the scope of
habeas corpus review of courts-martial proceedings. The petitioner, a
Naval paymaster's clerk, was found guilty of fraudulent misconduct by
a general court-martial. According to military regulations in effect at
that time, the sentence imposed by the court-martial board had to be
approved by a commanding officer before it was considered final. Pur-
suant to those regulations, the sentence was submitted to an admiral
for approval; however, the admiral refused to approve the sentence and
remanded the case to the board so the sentence could be revised. The
court re-sentenced the petitioner and imposed a longer confinement.
While confined under sentence, the petitioner sought release through
habeas corpus and was accorded a full hearing in the Massachusetts
federal district court.12 The petitioner raised the following issues at the
habeas proceeding: (1) the general court-martial had no jurisdiction to
try a paymaster's clerk; and (2) the court was without statutory author-
ity to revise its former sentence.
The United States Supreme Court held the military court had juris-
diction to try the petitioner and had been granted authority by the
appropriate regulations issued by the Secretary of the Navy to revise
its former sentence. The Court indicated the revision of sentence was
a matter of discretion for the court-martial and as long as it was ex-
ercised within authorized limits, it could not be made the subject of
habeas review. According to the Supreme Court, the writ was limited
to a determination of whether the court-martial had jurisdiction over
the subject matter, and power to impose the sentence. Hence, the judg-
ment of a court-martial could not be collaterally attacked on a habeas
corpus petition for mere errors or irregularities. It should be noted
the Court said nothing in regards to "constitutional error or irregular-
ity" since no constitutional issue was raised on appeal.
During this period, the same standard was applied by district courts
to petitions from federal civilian courts. In Ex parte Parks," the Su-
preme Court refused to review petitioner's allegation that the docu-
ment, which he had forged, was not that type of instrument specified
by the statute under which he was convicted. The Court noted this was
11. 100 U.S. 13 (1879).
12. Id.
13. 93 U.S. 18 (1876).
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a question of statutory interpretation for the military court, suitably
raised below by a demurrer and "[i]f. .. the court had jurisdiction and
power to convict and sentence, the writ cannot issue to correct a mere
error."
14
At the outset of the twentieth century, the number of issues review-
able on habeas corpus from the military and civilian courts began to
expand. Within the military sphere, the writ was extended to include
those issues in which the court-martial violated the governing statutes.
In McClaughry v. Deming,15 the petitioner, a volunteer soldier, argued
that he had been tried by an improperly constituted court-martial
board, since it was composed solely of officers of the Regular Army. The
Court agreed and held that the composition of the board violated the
seventy-seventh article of war.' 6 The Court indicated that since the
board lacked statutory authority for its existence, there was jurisdic-
tional error which was no mere question of statutory interpretation.
This decision extended the jurisdiction concept and the Court was then
able to inquire into matters heretofore not cognizable on a habeas
appeal.
Habeas corpus from federal, civilian custody also expanded in the
early part of this century. In Johnson v. Zerbst,17 the Court began to
re-define jurisdictional error to include collateral review of substantial
constitutional deprivations, not only certain statutory violations. In that
case the petitioner had been convicted of possession and distribution of
counterfeit Federal Reserve notes. He contended at the habeas hearing
that he had been denied the assistance of counsel in the military pro-
ceeding and, hence, his sixth amendment rights had been violated. The
district court held the petitioner could not obtain relief by habeas
corpus even if his sixth amendment rights to counsel had been violated
since the only issue to be reviewed is whether the lower court had juris-
diction. The Supreme Court rejected this view and reversed the district
court's decision. It held an unwarranted deprivation of counsel causes
a court to lose its jurisdiction and such a constitutional violation is a
reviewable jurisdictional error. The Court noted:
True habeas corpus cannot be used as a means of reviewing errors
14. Id. at 23.
15. 186 U.S. 49 (1902).
16. Specifically, the claim was brought on an interpretation of the Act of April 22,
1898, 30 Stat. 361, and the Act of March 2, 1899, 30 Stat. 977, as well as the seventy-seventh
article of war.
17. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
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of law and irregularities-not involving the question of jurisdic-
tion-occurring during the course of trial.... These principles,
however, must be construed and applied so as to preserve-not
destroy-constitutional safeguards of human life and liberty.18
The Court went on to add:
Since the Sixth Amendment constitutionally entitles one charged
with a crime to the assistance of counsel, compliance with this con-
stitutional mandate is an essential jurisdictional pre-requisite to a
federal court's authority to deprive an accused of his life or
liberty.... A court's jurisdiction at the beginning of trial may be
lost 'in the course of the proceedings' due to failure to complete
the court . . . by (not) providing counsel, for an accused . ... 19
Just as the concept of jurisdictional error was expanded to include
certain statutory violations by military courts, the Court could now
review constitutional deficiencies in civilian courts on the basis of their
constituting jurisdictional error. At the same time the Supreme Court
maintained the Great Writ was not being utilized as a "writ of error."
Several years later in Waley v. Johnston20 and White v. Ragan,21
the Court announced that jurisdictional error was not the only issue
which could be examined on a habeas writ from a petitioner confined
in a federal or state prison. Constitutional violations without any juris-
dictional basis also fell within the purview of habeas review. The Court
noted in Waley:
The use of the writ in the federal courts to test the constitutional
validity of a conviction for crime is not restricted to those cases
where the judgment of conviction is void for want of jurisdiction
of the trial court to render it. It extends also to those exceptional
cases where the conviction has been in disregard of the constitu-
tional rights of the accused .... 22
and remarked in White:
[T]he allegations of fact in the petitions [for habeas corpus] are
sufficient to make out prima facie cases of violation of these consti-
tutional rights of petitioners sufficient to invoke corrective process
in some court, and in the federal district court if none is afforded
by the state. 23
18. Id. at 465.
19. Id. at 467-68.
20. 316 U.S. 101 (1942).
21. 324 US. 760 (1945).
22. 316 US. at 104-05.
23. 324 U.S. at 764.
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It is suggested the "legal fiction" of jurisdictional error was discarded
by the Court as a tool for expanding the scope of habeas review to
include constitutional claims. The Court realized it would be difficult
in the future to find a jurisdictional basis or ground for reviewing
many constitutional violations. For example, although the absence of
counsel may cause the court to "lose jurisdiction," it is hard to foresee
how a coerced guilty plea or unreasonably seized evidence could cause
the court to "lose its jurisdiction" during the proceeding.
During this time, the Supreme Court was silent as to whether the
scope of habeas corpus review of military convictions also included a
review of alleged constitutional infirmities. The McClaughry standard
proved somewhat unsatisfactory in that statutory violations could de-
prive a court-martial of jurisdiction, whereas, an uncodified constitu-
tional right would not receive the protection of civilian federal court
review. As a result, the lower federal courts reached incredibly variant
positions on the permissible scope of review-ranging from a denial of
jurisdiction over a properly constituted court-martial, to almost total
review.24 A possible solution to the problems raised by McClaughry was
offered in White. However, the Supreme Court remained silent on the
question. After White, five courts of appeals held military personnel
could raise due process issues on habeas corpus.2 5 In one of these cases,
Innes v. Hiatt,26 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
We think that this basic guarantee of fairness afforded by the due
process clause of the fifth amendment applies to a defendant in
criminal proceedings in a federal military court as well as in a
federal civil court. An individual does not cease to be a person
within the protection of the fifth amendment . . . because he has
joined the nation's armed forces and has taken the oath to support
that constitution with his life, if need be.2 7
Finally in 1950, Hiatt v. Brown 28 came before the Court. The peti-
tioner was convicted by a general court-martial of murder and was
sentenced to life imprisonment. On petition for writ of habeas corpus
24. Compare Arnold v. Cozart, 75 F. Supp. 47 (N.D. Tex. 1948), with Anthony v.
Hunter, 71 F. Supp. 823 (D. Kan. 1947), where the habeas corpus petition of one
defendant was granted in Kansas while his co-defendant was denied the same relief in
Texas.
25. Montalvo v. Hiatt, 174 F.2d 645 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 874 (1949); Ben-
jamin v. Hunter, 169 F.2d 512 (10th Cir. 1948); United States ex rel. Weintraub v. Swan-
son, 165 F.2d 756 (2d Cir. 1948); United States ex rel. Innes v. Hiatt, 141 F.2d 664 (3d Cir.
1944); Schita v. King, 133 F.2d 283 (8th Cir. 1943).
26. 141 F.2d 664 (3d Cir. 1944).
27. Id. at 666.
28. 339 U.S. 103 (1950).
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the district court concluded that the military tribunal which convicted
the petitioner was improperly constituted and lacked jurisdiction over
the offense. 29 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed this
holding and additionally held the petitioner was deprived of due pro-
cess of law under the fifth amendment.30 After holding the court-martial
had jurisdiction over the offense, the Supreme Court summarily rejected
the view of the court of appeals that the military petitioner's due process
claims were cognizable by a district court in a habeas corpus proceed-
ing. Without discussing the validity of those claims, the Court stated:
The correction of any errors it [court-martial] may have committed
is for the military authorities which are alone authorized to review
its decision.31
The Court clearly indicated the court of appeals erred in extending its
review to determine whether there had been compliance by the military
court with the due process clause32 and stated, "the single inquiry, the
test, is jurisdiction. '33 The Supreme Court reversed the decision after
finding there were no jurisdictional defects.
It should be apparent from this brief, historical overview that the
scope of issues cognizable under the writ had been basically the same
for military and civilian actions. The Hiatt opinion marked the first
occasion that the Supreme Court sought to distinguish between habeas
corpus writs from the military and civilian courts. It is suggested this
decision was clearly untenable in view of the expanding concept of the
Great Writ.34 Three years later in Burns v. Wilson,85 the Court sought
to clarify the confusion arising from the Hiatt opinion. The Court
attempted to delineate the appropriate scope of federal court review of
habeas corpus petitions filed by military prisoners. Burns, however, did
not alleviate the confusion of the lower federal courts, but rather added
to it.36 Since Burns remains the leading decision on the scope of habeas
29. 81 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ga. 1948).
30. 175 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1949).
31. 339 U.S. at 111.
32. The petitioner argued his due process rights were violated since (I) the staff
judge advocate's report included erroneous propositions of law; (2) the evidence was
insufficient to sustain the conviction; (3) the pre-trial investigation was inadequate; and
(4) his counsel was ineffective.
33. 339 U.S. at 111.
34. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953); Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942);
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
35. 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
36. The Burns decision held a federal district court could not review on habeas
corpus petitions any claims by defendants which had been "fully and fairly considered."
This standard of review proved to be less than self-explanatory. See Sweet v. Taylor, 178
F. Supp. 456 (D. Kan. 1959), where a violation of constitutional rights at a court-martial
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corpus review of military decisions, it is essential this decision be clari-
fied and interpreted in a meaningful fashion.
A PROPOSED INTERPRETATION OF THE BURNS DECISION
In Burns, two servicemen were tried separately by Air Force courts-
martial and were found guilty of murder and rape. After exhausting all
of their military remedies, they filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The
petitioners alleged they had been denied due process of law in the
courts-martial proceedings. They charged they had been illegally de-
tained; coerced confessions were admitted at trial; they had been
denied effective assistance of counsel; military authorities interfered
with the preparation of their defenses; and their trials were conducted
in an atmosphere of terror and vengeance.
The district court dismissed the applications without reviewing any
evidence after concluding the military court had jurisdiction.37 The
court of appeals affirmed the decision but only after reviewing the en-
tire record.38 In a plurality opinion written by Mr. Justice Vinson the
Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals and
quoted Welchel v. McDonald:39
[W]hen a military decision has dealt fully and fairly with an allega-
tion raised in that application, it is not open to a federal court to
grant the writ simply to re-evaluate the evidence.40
The problem is twofold: first, what kind of allegations may be reviewed;
and second, what type of allegation is not to be subject to close scrutiny
by the district court if that court finds the military court has "fully and
fairly" considered it?
It is suggested the Court announced in Burns that men in the armed
forces are entitled to the protection of the due process clause of the fifth
amendment in courts-martial proceedings and that allegations of a
compelled the conclusion that fair consideration was not given to the defendant's claims;
In re Stapley, 246 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965), where a federal district court granted a
writ of habeas corpus to a military prisoner who had been unconstitutionally denied the
assistance of counsel. But see Le Ballister v. Warden, 247 F. Supp. 349 (D. Kan. 1965),
where on similar facts a federal district court denied the writ.
37. Dennis v. Lovett, 104 F. Supp. 310 (D.D.C. 1952).
38. Burns v. Lovett, 202 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
39. 340 U.S. 122 (1950).
40. 346 U.S. at 142 (emphasis added).
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denial of due process in the military court may be reviewed in a habeas
corpus proceeding. The Court stated:
The military courts, like the state courts, have the same responsibil-
ities as do the federal courts to protect a person from a violation of
his constitutional rights. In military habeas corpus cases, even more
than in state habeas corpus cases, it would be in disregard of the
statutory scheme if the federal civil courts failed to take account
of the prior proceedings. .... 41
It should be noted that in United States v. Tempia,42 the United States
Court of Military Appeals held military personnel are entitled to those
protections of the Bill of Rights that are not expressly43 or by necessary
implication 44 made inapplicable by the Constitution. The Court of
Military Appeals based its decision exclusively on Burns when it said:
The impact of Burns v. Wilson, then, is of an unequivocal holding
by the Supreme Court that the protections of the Constitution are
available to servicemen in military trials.4 5
Chief Justice Warren, speaking unofficially, described the opinion in
Burns as constituting " a recognition of the proposition that our citizens
in uniform may not be stripped of basic rights simply because they have
doffed their civilian clothes. '46 [Hence, the proposition that Burns ex-
panded the review powers of the federal courts in regard to military
decisions seems to be indisputable.47
Assuming that in response to the first necessary inquiry, a federal
district court must review allegations of constitutional infirmity in mili-
tary proceedings, are those allegations to be dismissed if the federal
court finds that they were "fully and fairly considered" in the military
court? If the answer is affirmative, the scope of habeas corpus review of
military decisions is much narrower than the review accorded the con-
stitutional claims of civilian prisoners which involve purely a question
of law or a mixed question of law and fact. In reviewing such constitu-
41. Id.
42. 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967).
43. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital,
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury,
except in cases arising in the land or naval forces .. "
44. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held a defendant who is subject to military
jurisdiction, by implication, has no right to a trial by an impartial jury and, therefore,
cannot claim sixth amendment protection. See Whelchel v. McDonald, 340 U.S. 122 (1950);
Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U.S. 1 (1920).
45. 16 U.S.C.M.A. at 634, 34 C.M.R. at 254.
46. Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 182, 188 (1962).
47. Easley v. Hunter, 209 F.2d 483 (10th Cir. 1953).
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tional claims of civilian prisoners, the district court does not consider
whether the state court gave full and fair consideration to those claims
but only considers whether the petitioner's constitutional rights have
been violated.4
Most early cases in the federal circuit courts did adopt a narrow view
of the Burns opinion-constitutional issues could not b'e reviewed if
the military courts had fully considered and fairly decided the ques-
tions presented.49 Many circuits still adhere to this view. Those courts
which have adopted this interpretation of Burns, however, have gener-
ally failed to explicitly state what standard of fairness they have applied.
This interpretation of Burns would lead one to logically conclude that
so long as the manner in which the military tribunal decides the consti-
tutional issues before it is "full and fair," the nature of their decision
is irrelevant. Certainly, this conclusion was not intended by the Burns
Court.50 It is suggested there can be only one "fair" determination of a
constitutional claim-one that is in accordance with standards of consti-
tutional sufficiency established by the Supreme Court. Military courts
must not be permitted to abort constitutional safeguards under the
guise of full and fair decision-making processes.
It is suggested a proper reading of Burns would be where the con-
stitutional issue involves a question of law or a mixed question of law
and fact it should be given an exhaustive, de novo review by the district
court at a full independent hearing. Where the constitutional issue
involves purely a factual question the federal court's inquiry should be
limited to determining whether the military court gave full and fair
consideration to the constitutional issues, e.g., whether the finding was
reasonably supported by the record and was the result of a full and
48. The Supreme Court in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), held a federal evi-
dentiary hearing was mandatory under certain circumstances. One of these circumstances
is when the petitioner alleges he was "otherwise denied due process of law in the state
court proceeding." The "full and fair" language was not used by the Townsend court to
refer to allegations of due process denials involving questions of law or mixed questions
of law and fact; however, that court indicated the petitioner must allege he did not
receive "a full and fair hearing" in order to receive a federal evidentiary hearing if he
is claiming he was denied due process of law because the fact-finding procedure employed
by the state court was not adequate. These "circumstances" were codified in the habeas
corpus statute. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254(d) (1970).
49. Mitchell v. Swope, 224 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1955); Shaw v. United States, 209 F.2d 811
(D.C. Cir. 1954); Easley v. Hunter, 203 F.2d 483 (10th Cir. 1953).
50. If this is the case, it would be possible for the military courts to find a defendant's
statement, which was taken at the point of a gun by military authorities, was not violative
of the fifth amendment and for the federal district court to refuse to issue the writ
because it decided the military court "fully and fairly" considered the petitioners claim-
the military court examined every aspect of the claim and decided it without any pre-
conceived notions of guilt.
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fair evidentiary hearing. The plurality opinion in Burns stated the
"evidence of the occurrence of events which tend to prove or dis-
prove one of the allegations" will not be reviewed. 51 All petitioner's
claims in Burns were factually disputed by the military and decided
by the military courts against the defendants. The Court said the peti-
tioners failed to establish the authenticity of their allegations and would
not be granted the "opportunity to make a new record, to prove de novo
in the District Court precisely the case which they failed to prove in the
military courts. '5 2 Four months prior to the Burns decision the six
justices who concurred in Burns also concurred in Brown v. Allen.53
In that case the Supreme Court emphasized factual allegations decided
by the state courts could be accepted by the federal judge as true unless
there had been a "vital flaw" in the state fact-finding process. However,
the federal judge had to decide for himself mixed questions of law and
fact as well as the application of constitutional principles to the facts
as found.5 4 After two opinions of the Court by the same justices, it is
inconceivable that the full and fair consideration test in Burns would
mean something different from the explanation of review powers given
in Brown. Without doubt, the Court applied the standard of review
adopted in that case to the case presented by the petitioners in Burns.55
After 1965 at least four federal circuits, in determining the proper
review of military decisions, have recognized and applied the distinc-
tion between constitutional issues resting solely upon factual allegations
and constitutional issues which are not totally dependent upon those
allegations.56 This distinction is a legally viable one-it recognizes the
need for a review of alleged constitutional infirmities in the military
by a civilian court which is particularly adept "in dealing with the nice
51. 346 U.S. at 144.
52. Id. at 146.
53. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
54. Id. at 506-07.
55. Although the Brown decision has been overruled by the court in Townsend v. Sain,
372 U.S. 293 (1963), it did so only in regard to when a district court must indulge in
independent fact-finding at an evidentiary hearing; it did not affect the holding that
independent de novo review must be given when the state petitioner alleged due process
violations involving questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact. In fact, the
Townsend rule is consistent with this writer's interpretation of Burns since the Court in
that case speaks of a necessity to have a full evidentiary hearing; when facts are in
dispute, only if the petitioner did not receive a "full and fair" evidentiary hearing in
the state court.
56. Allen v. Van Cantfort, 436 F.2d 625 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1008 (1971);
Kaufman v. Secretary of the Air Force, 415 F.2d 991 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1013 (1970); Harris v. Ciccone, 417 F.2d 479 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1078
(1969); Kennedy v. Commandant, 377 F.2d 339 (10th Cir. 1967).
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subtleties of constitutional law" 57 but at the same time does not transfer
the ultimate fact-finding function from the military to the federal dis-
trict courts. Federal courts should not be forced to have a full evi-
dentiary hearing or to exhaustively explore the transcript of the trial of
every military, state, or federal habeas corpus petitioner to be certain
that factual determinations made by the lower court were correct even
though those factual disputes have "constitutional overtones." The
federal court, in such a case, should only examine the record to deter-
mine if those factual determinations are reasonably supported by the
record and were found after a full and fair evidentiary hearing in the
military court. If it finds they were reasonably supported by the record
and were found after a full and fair evidentiary hearing in the military
court, it should be said that the military court "fully and fairly" con-
sidered the defendant's constitutional claim and the writ should not
be issued. This proposition is in accord with the "any evidence rule"
which has been historically applied by district courts in habeas proceed-
ings to determine whether a state or federal prisoner has been convicted
beyond a reasonable doubt.58 The court's only inquiries are whether
there was any evidence of record to sustain the conviction and whether
the reasonable doubt standard necessary for conviction was applied on
the face of the record. Whether a defendant has been convicted beyond
a reasonable doubt is a constitutional issue59 and dependent upon fac-
tual determinations.60
Several illustrations can best demonstrate the operation of this pro-
posed distinction. Assume a military defendant alleged in his habeas
petition that his privilege against self-incrimination had been violated
but the validity of his claim rested upon whether he was beaten during
interrogation by military authorities. The military court found, as a
question of fact, that he was not beaten. Since the validity of this con-
stitutional claim is dependent upon the military court erring in its
57. 417 F.2d at 481. Accord, O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969); Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1 (1957); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
58. Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960); Holloway v. Cox, 437 F.2d
412 (4th Cir. 1971); Williams v. Peyton, 414 F.2d 776 (4th Cir. 1969).
59. The Court held the reasonable doubt standard is constitutionally required in
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). It should be noted the federal courts which have
dealt with this issue of review since the Winship decision have applied the long estab-
lished "any evidence rule," holding that Winship did not grant any additional mandate
to the federal courts regarding a review of the facts. See Holloway v. Cox, 437 F.2d 412
(4th Cir. 1971); Dickerson v. Cox, 316 F. Supp. 865 (W.D. Va. 1970).
60. In Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 484 (1895), the court stated the jury must
be convinced the evidence presented is "sufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt the
existence of every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged."
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factual determination, the district court should only examine the evi-
dence introduced at trial to determine if that finding was reasonably sus-
tained by the record and the petitioner received a full and fair
evidentiary hearing in the military court. If it finds those requirements
were fulfilled after examining the record, the petition should be dis-
missed. However, assume a military defendant alleged his privilege
against self-incrimination had been violated because he was told by
military authorities that "he had better talk" immediately after he had
been advised of his constitutional right to remain silent. The fact that
he had been told "he had better talk" and the fact that he was advised
of his rights immediately beforehand were not in dispute during the
court-martial. The military court found these procedures did not
violate his privilege against self-incrimination and his confession was
admissible. Since the petitioner's constitutional claim raises a mixed
question of law and fact, the district court should review this decision
de novo at an independent hearing in the federal court.,'
PUBLIC POLICY AND EQUAL PROTECTION
District courts, which have interpreted Burns to hold that military
defendants are entitled to a narrower review on habeas corpus than
civilian defendants, have historically based their interpretation upon
several public policy considerations. They are fearful an extension of
full civil review to military, constitutional claims will disrupt military
discipline, grant review powers to courts which are not sensitive to
military needs, and render Congressional enactments meaningless.
It is suggested these predicted effects are based upon mere uncer-
tainty. They lose the element of persuasiveness upon close scrutiny.
There is no doubt military law is a system of articles and regulations
for the government of the armed forces established by Congress under
Article I powers . 2 It deals specifically and intentionally with the
maintenance of discipline in the armed services. 3 Because ordinary
rules of law do not seek to cope with problems peculiar to the govern-
ment of the military establishment, a special set of rules may well be
indispensable in prosecuting military offenses. However, the prosecu-
61. See Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954), where the distinction is applied to similar
facts.
62. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14 provides Congress shall have the power: "To make
Rules for the government and Regulation of the land and naval forces ...
63. See Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1879).
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tion of offenses and review of convictions are separate and distinct
functions; Congress has recognized these functional differences and has
enacted the UCMJ and the federal habeas corpus statute. It is conceded
the military must be free to operate in such a manner as to insure the
effective performance of its mission; yet collateral review would not
require any additional procedures which would detract from the mili-
tary's primary mission. Although some existing military procedures
might need to be altered to conform to due process standards, the same
statement can be made about procedures utilized by state courts. If
these possible alterations are not sufficient to exempt state convictions
from the purview of collateral supervision, there is no reason why the
military should be excluded from the review powers of the federal
courts.
It cannot be said review per se interferes with the maintenance of
discipline in the armed services since the direct review of military con-
victions occurs within the military judicial system provided by Con-
gress.6 4 How can it then be said that civilian review interferes with the
maintenance of discipline in the armed services? It is preposterous to
assume the reviewing judge wearing black robes rather than gold braid
will cause "restlessness among the troops." On the contrary, it is con-
tended that respect for military law and the general morale of service-
men would be enhanced by the civil courts ensuring the protection of
servicemen's constitutional rights. Discipline will only improve if the
citizen-soldier is made to feel he is not forgotten by the civilian estab-
lishment and that by donning a uniform his fundamental rights have
not been gravely diminished in the eyes of the federal judiciary. Dissatis-
faction with military justice can only be quieted when that legal system
is placed in perspective in the democratic society which maintains it.
The fear that an extension of full civil review to military constitu-
tional claims will grant review powers to courts which are not sensitive
to military needs is unfounded. A real basis for fear exists when the
federal courts allow the military courts to become the final arbiters of
a defendant's constitutional rights. When a federal court refuses to
consider de novo any constitutional claim raised by a military defen-
dant, the military courts are left to balance the delicate and competing
interests of fundamental fairness and military order and discipline. The
military courts are recognizably inadequate to perform this awesome
task. Military courts are courts of inferior and limited jurisdiction and
64. Harris v. Ciccone, 417 F.2d 479, 481 (8th Cir. 1969).
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a recent opinion of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has reminded
us that courts-martial are singularly inept in dealing with the nice
subtleties of constitutional law. As the Supreme Court stated in O'Cal-
lahan v. Parker:
[A] civilian trial, in other words, is held in an atmosphere con-
ducive to the protection of individual rights, while a military trial
is marked by the age-old manifest destiny of retributive justice.
In addition, the continuing dimunition of jurisdiction of military
tribunals resulting from the Court's decisions has been motivated, at
least in part, by the Court's recognition that military courts are not
designed to protect a defendant's consitutional rights. 66 However, the
federal courts are competent to balance the demands of military dis-
cipline and the importance of individual liberty. The district court's
review of the applicability and interpretation of certain provisions of
the Bill of Rights will be tempered by the demands of military order
and discipline in appropriate cases. 67 Historically, the federal district
courts have utilized this balancing process to resolve constitutional is-
sues in all areas of the law. Constitutional issues raised by military de-
fendants should be no exception. An absence of acute expertise on
military discipline and order should not be the basis for exempting
military decisions from constitutional scrutiny by the federal court in ha-
beas proceedings. Such expertise is not necessary for a court to safeguard
the rights and personal liberties of the defendant. All that is required is
for the federal court to consider every factor relevant to the defendant's
peculiar status, the needs and characteristics of the organization to which
he belongs and from which he derives his status, and the purpose, his-
tory, and effect of the constitutional mandate.68 It is suggested when
the supposed "grounds for fear" are placed opposite the apparent
65. 395 U.S. 258, 266 (1969).
66. See O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969) (jurisdiction limited to service-
connected crimes); McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960) (no
jurisdiction over non-capital offense of civilian employees of military overseas); Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (no jurisdiction for civilian dependents overseas); United States
ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1953) (no jurisdiction over ex-servicemen).
67. See Kaufman v. Secretary of the Air Force, 415 F.2d 991, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1013 (1970).
68. Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Such factors are always utilized by district
courts when dealing with the applicability of due process safeguards to defendants who
possess a special or peculiar "status." An example of this situation in an area other than
the military is the application of due process safeguards to juvenile delinquency pro-
ceedings.
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strengths of civilian review and considered in light of the military
court's countervailing inadequacies, those "fears" quickly dissipate.
If these feigned and artificial policy considerations are the sole
grounds utilized by district courts to sustain their view that the holding
in Burns accords military defendants a narrower scope of habeas review
than civilian defendants, it is suggested such an interpretation would
be violative of the military defendant's right to equal protection of the
law. Since this concept is embodied in the fifth amendment due process
guarantees, it should be applicable to military defendants.6 9 A defendant
convicted in a state court, having exhausted all state remedies, would
be afforded a habeas corpus remedy whereby the federal courts would
review de novo his constitutional allegations which do not raise purely
factual issues. The state proceeding becomes an object of intense re-
view designed to seek out and correct any constitutional infirmityJ 0
However, should that defendant have suffered the misfortune of con-
viction for the same crime in a military tribunal, the review given by
the federal court would be of the military court's mode of decision and
not whether the military's decision was violative of the defendant's
constitutional rights. Quite possibly, one prisoner could be freed and
the other punished without just cause.
This variance in treatment would appear to be the antithesis of the
command of equal protection since it is based on an unjust classification
of criminal defendants. Such a variance in treatment can only be sus-
tained if the classification upon which it is based is just. As the Court
stated in Walters v. City of St. Louis:71
[The classification must] rest on real and not feigned differences;
that the distinction have some relevance to the purpose for which
the classification is made, and that the different treatments be not
so disparate, relative to the difference in classification, as to be
wholly arbitrary.7 2
The Supreme Court has held in several cases that a state which
grants appellate review can only do so in a way which does not dis-
69. Cf. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
70. Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290-91 (1969).
71. 347 U.S. 231 (1954).
72. Id. at 237. Accord, Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966); Harper v. Virginia Board
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Baxstrom v. Herald, 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
73. Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971); Burns v. Ohio, 360 US. 252 (1959);
Eskridge v. Washington State Board of Prison Terms and Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958);
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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criminate against indigent convicted defendants. 78 As the Court noted
in Griffin v. Illinois:74
[A] state is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide
appellate courts or a right to an appellate review at all .... But
that is not to say that a State that does grant appellate review
can do so in a way that discriminates against some convicted defen-
dants on account of their poverty.75
In all of these cases, the defendants were not able to exercise their
rights of appeal because they were financially unable to furnish the
appellate court with a transcript of the trial below. The Supreme Court
held that in such cases the state must furnish these defendants with
transcripts without cost so all defendants would have the same op-
portunity to process their appeals, regardless of one's impoverished
status.
Just as a defendant's right to appeal should not be dependent upon
his financial status, neither should it be determined by a defendant's
military status when there is no compelling public policy reason to
warrant such distinct and different treatment. Any individual, regard-
less of his status, has a federally guaranteed constitutional right to seek
the Great Writ.76 Although the military defendant is not totally denied
access to this remedy by a narrow interpretation of the Burns decision,
this interpretation can clearly be determinative in many cases, of
whether the petitioner is freed or confined.77 Additionally, the Court
in Griffin indicated clearly that an arbitrary classification scheme need
not deny a defendant's appeal entirely in order to violate the defendant's
right to equal protection of the law.78 If the appellate rights of the
74. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
75. Id. at 18.
76. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1)-(2) (1970).
77. Although the United States Court of Military Appeals in United States v. Tempia,
16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967), made certain provisions of the Bill of Rights
applicable to military proceedings, this does not diminish the need for military decisions
to receive the same scope of habeas review that civilian decisions receive; for there would
still be absent any substantial collateral, civilian check of military decisions, leaving the
Court of Military Appeals as the final arbiter of a military defendant's constitutional
rights. As a result, different gradations and applications of the same constitutional stan-
dard applied by two separate court systems could result in a military defendant being
confined while a civilian prisoner goes free, without just cause, under identical facts.
78. In this case, the defendant was able to seek relief by writ of error but was finan-
cially unable to seek full, direct appellate review because he could not afford the cost of
a transcript of the trial. According to the state procedural rules, the defendant could
only raise federal or state constitutional violations on appeal by writ of error; non-
constitutionally related issues could only be raised on direct appeal. The Court held such
a limitation of review without valid cause violated his right to equal protection of the
law.
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defendant differ or if he receives a different degree or scope of appellate
review than other defendants because of some unwarranted reason, he
has not received equal protection of the law under the fifth and four-
teenth amendments. In regards to the review of military cases, it is
irrelevant that the determinative status of the defendant is "soldier"
rather than "indigent" and the appellate review is "collateral" rather
than "direct," for the same constitutional deprivation exists--different
types of review exist without any compelling justification for their co-
existence.
CONCLUSION
The citizen-soldier being held on military authority under sentence
pursuant to a court-martial conviction has the right to attack that
conviction on writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the military
authorities violated his constitutional right of due process and denied
him the substance of a fair trial. It is proposed that since the Supreme
Court decided Burns v. Wilson the federal courts have jurisdiction to
determine whether fundamental constitutional rights have been vio-
lated by military courts, and federal courts should review them de novo
when those claims do not raise purely factual issues. When the constitu-
tional claims advanced by military prisoners are dependent upon dis-
puted facts, the federal court's review should entail only a determina-
tion of whether the military court's findings were reasonably sustained
by the record and whether the petitioner received a full and fair factual
hearing below. This interpretation of Burns makes the federal court's
scope of review of military decisions consistent with that utilized in
their review of state and federal convictions and does not transfer the
ultimate fact-finding mission to the district court.
Although historically, the military justice system has evolved inde-
pendently through "congressional fiat," it has never been supposed
that the military was to be excluded from the review powers granted to
the federal courts by the habeas corpus statute.7 9 The fact that Congress
is vested with the responsibility of making military laws should not
deny the serviceman the protection of his constitutional rights afforded
by the collateral review powers of the federal courts. The historical
separateness of the military legal system is irrelevant where constitu-
tional claims are at issue. The dual standard of habeas review which
79. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1970).
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had arisen between military and civil convictions is an historical aber-
ration which the equal protection clause demands must be re-evaluated.
If the military justice system is to be placed in perspective with the
democratic society which maintains it, the scope of habeas corpus re-
view of military decisions must be based upon a rational examination
of all the relevant factors and not merely upon procedural or jurisdic-
tional talismans.
M. LAWRENCE SHIELDS, III
